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Department of Defense envisions, and is currently developing, a wide array of System of 
Systems and Net-centric warfighting systems that interconnect with many platforms and 
information repositories designed to provide warfighters information superiority over any 
adversary.  It is critical that information and data passing through and between these 
systems are secure against any threat or attempt to access, manipulate, or change the data 
in any way.  In addition, these systems are beginning to interconnect with other federal 
systems outside the purview of DoD.   
The DoD and other federal entities have developed differing certification 
processes and differing test and evaluation requirements to support the certification 
process.  As the need for cross domain interconnectivity increases, the need for more 
standardized certification test and evaluation processes becomes apparent.  
The Joint Applied Project investigates and provides a comprehensive overview of 
the current Certification Test and Evaluation (CT&E) testing and reporting practices 
within the National Security Agency.  The goal of this project is to identify and document 
both the process and methodology currently in use during CT&E testing, and to analyze 
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DoD envisions and is currently developing a wide array of System of Systems and 
Net-centric warfighting systems that interconnect with many platforms and information 
repositories designed to provide warfighters information superiority over any adversary.  
It is critical that information and data passing through and between these systems are 
secure against any threat or attempt to access, manipulate, or change the data in any way.  
In addition, these systems are beginning to interconnect with other federal systems 
outside the purview of DoD.   
The DoD and other federal entities have developed differing certification 
processes and differing test and evaluation requirements to support the certification 
process.  As the need for Cross Domain interconnectivity increases, the need for more 
standardized certification test and evaluation processes becomes apparent.  
The Joint Applied Project investigates and provides a comprehensive overview of 
the current Certification Test and Evaluation (CT&E) testing and reporting practices 
within the National Security Agency.  The goal of this project is to identify and document 
both the process and methodology currently in use during CT&E testing, and to analyze 




THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
3 
 
I. INTRODUCTION  
One of the major tenets of both the National Security Strategy (NSS) and National 
Military Strategy (NMS) is Information Dominance (Obama, 2010).  To that end, 
strategic and tactical information systems have been developed or expanded dramatically 
over the past decade in the Department of Defense (DoD), Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS), National Security Agency (NSA), and other Intelligence Community 
(IC) entities.  To leverage these assets across the federal government, systems have been, 
or soon will be interconnected to share information.   
A major concern of these federal information systems is Information Assurance 
(IA), which can be basically defined as protecting information and information systems 
from unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption, modification, or destruction.  While 
this is a common concern across federal agencies, the approach for risk management, IA 
certification, and the supporting test and evaluation processes differs amongst federal 
entities.   These differences create even more problems when attempting to interconnect 
systems as IA processes and certifications must be maintained in both interconnected 
‘domains’ as well as within the information exchange processes and devices.   
When examining the certification and associated test and evaluation standards for 
potential interconnected, cross-domain systems, additional or differing tests are often 
required to satisfy the Cross-Domain Solution (CDS) IA standards.  This obviously 
causes delay and additional funding requirements for one or both systems.  NSA has been 
designated as the lead federal agency in setting standards for CDS IA evaluations. 
The National Security Telecommunications and Information Systems Security 
Committee (NSTISSC), now known as the Committee on National Security Systems 
(CNSS) issued policy NSTISSP 11, in January 2000 and revised it in June 2003.  
The acquisition of all GOTS IA [Government Off-The-Shelf Information 
Assurance] and IA-enabled products to be used on systems entering, 





information shall be limited to products which have been evaluated by 
NSA [National Security Agency], or in accordance with NSA-approved 
processes. (NSTISSP 11, 2003, p. 2) 
The NSA’s Cross Domain Solutions Test and Evaluations Division has developed and 
formulated policy in conduct of Certification Test and Evaluation (CT&E) testing in 
support of NSTISSP 11 in the form of handbooks or guides. Discussion of the various 
documents as they apply to CT&E testing and augmentation by a test plan framework is 
developed in this research. 
A. BACKGROUND 
The acquisition of Government-off-the-shelf Information Assurance (GOTS IA) 
and IA-enabled Information Technology (IT) products to be used on systems entering, 
processing, storing, displaying, or transmitting national security information shall be 
limited to products that have been evaluated by the National Security Agency (NSA), or 
in accordance with NSA-approved processes (CT&E Handbook, 2009). The National 
Security Telecommunications and Information Systems Security Policy (NSTISSP) 
No.11, provides the policy that products shall meet appropriate criteria to ensure integrity 
and confidentiality of information and also ensuring that authentication and non-
repudiation are active during the exchange of electronic data transactions. NSA Cross 
Domain Solution (CDS) Certification Test and Evaluation (CT&E) Handbook, Version 
3.4 (25 August 2006) defines the test objectives required for CDS devices using Security 
Requirement (SR) categorized into nine test objective derivations. The resulting data feed 
into the Risk Decision Authority Criteria (RDAC), which provides a method to measure 
the risk of CDS implementation and a method for making a connection decision by the 
Defense Information Systems Network (DISN) connection approval authorities for a 
CDS implementation. In an effort to improve sharing of information objectives between 
the Department of Defense (DoD) and Intelligence Community (IC), the Unified Cross 
Domain Management Office (UCDMO) was chartered in March 2007. Additionally, this 
office chartered a Community Security Testing Group (CSTG) with a primary mission to 
develop test readiness requirements and test objectives that can be interchanged, and 
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using reciprocity, can be applied to both DoD and the IC CDS requirements. The CSTG 
has recommended CDS security controls for inclusion into the National Institute for 
Standards and Technology (NIST) Special Publication (SP 800-53) to improve 
reciprocity and standardize common controls during CT&E testing. Adoption of these 
security controls by DoD, IC, and NSA will ultimately streamline and reduce the 
exorbitant cost of the CT&E conduct. Implementation of these security controls requires 
tailoring of the discrete security controls for the particular type of cross-domain solution 
placed under test. While it may be a simple matter to tailor these security controls for a 
particular test, a test plan is the ideal vehicle to codify the selected controls and provide a 
plan of instruction to enable a consistent test environment for all labs involved in testing 
CDS security products. Thus, a common master test plan framework would enable and 
provide efficiency to the overall process of vetting and validating CDS, while 
simultaneously providing rigorous security testing to minimize vulnerabilities for the user 
communities. 
B. MOTIVATION 
Testing of CDS devices requires detailed understanding of security categories and 
processes that investigate the efficacy of protecting data or traffic flow between differing 
security enclaves. Current testing methodology is deficient in providing fiscal and test 
duration savings. The inclusion of a test plan framework will allow for a more 
streamlined approach for the current test methodology to recognize the impact of the 
security controls and the RDAC Risk Management Framework as it applies to both fiscal 
and schedule constraints. Current test methodology uses security controls developed, with 
the cooperation with NIST and NSA, that are tailored to the CDS type under test. These 
security controls, however, are not detailed enough to provide a step-by-step test 
scenario. Further tailoring and discussions between the test lab and the NSA point-of-
contact are required to identify the appropriateness of a particular security control for the 
device under test. These discussions normally occur during the conduct of the test, which 
may impact schedule and funding of the test effort. The inclusion of a test plan would 
avoid these additional tailoring functions as the plan would provide the necessary 
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information at the start of the test, not during the testing phase, which would likely be 
disruptive to the schedule and add to testing costs. This research recognizes that the 
testing process should be planned, given valid security controls and sufficient tailoring of 
these controls, to affect a timely and completed analysis of test results that are used to 
provide a risk rating using the RDAC methodology. 
Research methodologies used in the development of this Project relied on existing 
documents and regulations. Current processes were inspected in view of documentation 
that was in draft or had outdated status. In addition to the volume of existing 
documentation, the CASTER software program was investigated to fulfill a need for 




A. SECURITY REQUIREMENT AND SECURITY CONTROLS 
1. Security Categories 
The Cross Domain Solution (CDS) Certification Test and Evaluation (CT&E) 
Handbook developed and published by NSA I123 Directorate, defines the test objectives 
required for CDS devices using Security Categories (SGs). (CT&E Handbook) The 
following table enumerates these security categories. With a shift in testing methodology, 
security controls finalized in NIST SP 800-53 rev. 3 and CJCSI 6211.02C are now used 
as input to RDAC. Documentation to implement this shift is currently in draft and 
expected for final release during 2010. 
Table 1.   Security Categories 
Category Requirement Label 
SR1 Documentation 
SR2 Configuration Management 
SR3 Local Base System Security 
SR4 Remote Access Control 
SR5 Data Flow Configuration & Review 
SR6 Content Filtering Verification 
SR7 System Integrity  
SR8 Stress Testing 
SR9 Penetration Testing 
 
A guard is designed to ensure secure data sharing between networks of differing 
classifications and to provide protection against the loss of classified data or introduction 
of malicious code into the classified network.  To verify the secure transfer of data by the 
guard, a set of nine Security Categories (SGs) were developed.  These SRs were initially 
derived from a review of: 
• Common Criteria high-assurance characteristics 
• Previous assessment reports for the Secure Network Server (SNS) and 
Defense Information Infrastructure (DII) guards 
• DoD 8500.1 Information Assurance [Canceled DoD 5200.28-STD] and 
DoDI 8500.2 Information Assurance Implementation 
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The results of testing against the SRs are to create a body of evidence that can be 
used to perform a risk assessment of the CDS to determine its appropriateness for the 
proposed implementation.  These results of the CT&E, or body of evidence, will identify 
potential weaknesses that can be corrected or mitigated to attain a secure CDS. Each SR 
is comprised of rationale statements with further explanation of how the SG should be 
tested during a CT&E and then translated into test procedural requirements used in 
writing specific tests.   
2. Security Controls 
Security Controls developed with the creation of the UCDMO under a charter 
signed by both the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Network Information Integration 
(ASD NII) / Department of Defense Chief Information Officer (CIO), and Associate 
Director of National Intelligence Chief Information Officer. The National Institute of 
Standards and Technology (NIST), in concert with the UCDMO, developed a standard 
set of security controls specifically tailored for CDS that allow all federal government 
organizations to establish a baseline for testing to allow for reciprocity in acceptance of 
CT&E results for all tests. NIST Special Publication 800-53, Information Security, 
recommends security controls that can be tailored for the different type of CDS devices 
and the associated deployment environment. The DoD community is expected to adopt 
NIST SP 800-53 by the summer of Fiscal Year 2011 (FY11) and replace the current DoD 
Information Assurance Certification and Accreditation Process (DIACAP) security 
categories.  
B. COMPETING RISK MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK (RDAC AND NIST) 
NSA’s Risk Decision Authority Criteria (RDAC) Version 2.2 describes 
methodology for risk certifiers to summarize and to identify risks associated with the 
CDS devices. The criteria provide a way to recommend acceptable levels of risk, as well 
as to consider how those risk factors can be traded off against each other.  The criteria are 
not only intended for use by accrediting agents resolving complex mission-versus-risk 
issues, but they can also be used during initial analysis of a cross domain requirement.  
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Because the RDAC takes an architectural approach to analysis, best-case risk analysis 
can be performed prior to formal testing and be considered when determining whether to 
expend resources testing new or updated CDS technology. 
Another approach of risk management is the NIST Risk Management Framework 
which uses a security life cycle approach. NIST SP 800-59, Security Categorization 
provided guidelines for identification of Information Systems as a National Security 
System (NSS).  National Security Systems are defined as using functions such as 
intelligence operations, involving cryptographic activities, command and control systems, 
equipment that is integral or part of a weapons system, and is critical to the direct 
fulfillment of a military or intelligence mission.  
Both the RDAC and the NIST approach identify risk associated with the CDS 
devices. NIST uses Impact Categorization for the security aspects of risk, it does not 
provide a structure for the Operational Impact of accreditation decisions or the 
“enterprise risk” objective of the C&A Transformation Risk Executive Function. RDAC, 
however, was developed for the collateral DISN, the Defense IA Security Accreditation 
Working Group (DSAWG), and DISN Flag Panel to assist in the decision-making 
process on whether to allow a cross-domain connection. 
C. THE TEST PLAN FRAMEWORK – THE SOLUTION 
Cross Domain Solution testing requires a significant preparation phase prior to 
engaging the test team. Current documentation emphasizes the risk analyses as a solution 
to test planning, however, the lack of a test plan framework creates an ad-hoc test 
scenario mostly driven by NSA’s point of contact assigned to the laboratory that executes 
the test. The current implementation of RDAC is used as a model to fill in the necessary 
test scenarios as a mechanism to evaluate the risk for a particular assigned risk element. 
Technical and Data risk are two elements required for CT&E testing and are further 
decomposed into threat groups. These groups are then segregated into technical, 
preventative, and detective facets.  Certification & Accreditation Security Test & 
Evaluation Repository (CASTER), the automated test repository, uses the RDAC facets 
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to develop test scenarios that can be stored and retrieved from a master database to ensure 
coverage is complete for each assigned test. The CASTER software has not been updated 
to reflect the current RDAC 2.2, but uses the superseded RDAC 2.  The hierarchy is 
described in figure 1. Note that the CASTER software only addresses the right hand side 
of the diagram. 
 




The determination on how many and what types of test scenarios are required is 
decided by the NSA POC as the test is being executed. This process introduces ad-hoc 
interpretation of the amount of testing required to satisfy the risk threat and thus, affects 
the test schedule and associated costs. The introduction of a Test Plan Framework (TPF) 
would likely provide the necessary structure to map out the required tests that both satisfy 
the RDAC requirement and also ensure that sufficient test data is collected. The purpose 
of the TPF is to provide a definitive structure and methodology that promotes uniformity 
in test scenarios and allows for a better report output that is fed into the RDAC 
assessment. The remainder of this document explains how the TPF is integrated into the 
current overall test methodology to ensure complete and consistently valid test results 









A. CT&E TEST PHASE METHODOLOGY – CURRENT STATE 
Complete and efficient testing of Cross Domain Solution devices relies on 
processes and methodologies that are currently in a state of flux. The Cross Domain 
Solution (CDS) Certification Test and Evaluation (CT&E) Handbook Version 3.4 was 
last updated in August 2006, and sets forth processes and procedures used in the conduct 
of the test evaluation. 
The purpose of this document is to provide the independent government 
labs with a structured, repeatable approach to assess the security and 
functional features of a CDS.  Because CDSs are used to transfer data 
between networks of differing classifications, a high degree of trust is 
placed in their ability to protect the network of higher classification from 
attack and to prevent the accidental release of classified data to the 
network of lower classification.  The CT&E process defined in this 
document provides the methodology for independent testing and 
evaluation of a particular CDS. (CT&E Handbook Ver. 3.4, 2006, p. 9) 
Other documents and software applications that are utilized during testing are the 
Risk Decision Authority Criteria Implementation Guide, Version 2.2, and the 
Certification and Accreditation Security Test and Evaluation Repository (CASTER) 
software program. CASTER implements the risk criteria requirement to ensure that all 
required testing satisfies and enables an RDAC rating. The CT&E handbook further 
describes four phases that are used in performance of a test event. 
• The Planning Phase consists of identifying the cost, schedule, and scope of the 
CT&E, establishment of the CT&E team, and defining the various roles and 
responsibilities for the test process (CT&E Handbook Ver. 3.4, 2006, p. 16). 
• The Preparation Phase consists of establishing the lab environment, continuing 
familiarization with the CDS, and beginning the development of the CT&E test 
objectives using the Certification and Accreditation Security Test and Evaluation 
Repository (CASTER) (CT&E Handbook Ver. 3.4, 2006, p. 25).  
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• The Testing Phase includes identifying the guidelines for classifying documents, 
media, or equipment, defining individual test procedures for each test objective, 
dry running the test procedures, defining and accomplishing the formal testing, 
and documenting the test results in CASTER (CT&E Handbook Ver. 3.4, 2006, p. 
55).  
• The final phase is the Results Phase, which includes making risk level 
determinations for each of the findings, determining possible countermeasures 
and recommendations, completing the CDS CT&E Report, and coordinating the 
final document through the CDS Requirements and Evaluations Division (CT&E 
Handbook Ver. 3.4, 2006, p. 60).  
The draft CT&E Handbook updates the nine security requirements in Table 1 and 
replaces them with a catalog of security controls defined in NIST SP 800-53. The 
CASTER software is being updated to take advantage of the security control as defined in 
SP 800-53. Until completed, the current testing efforts remain in differing states of 
testing methodology. This differing state of testing is demonstrated by the latest test 
effort for Project Manager (PM) Brigade Combat Team Modernization (BCTM), which 
uses the security requirement testing methodology as defined in the CT&E Handbook 
Ver. 3.4 and the test data application CASTER uses the RDAC version 2 risk criteria. 
Ideally, the methodology should represent the latest risk and testing criteria as defined in 
the CT&E Handbook Ver. DRAFT 2009 and the current Risk Decision Authority Criteria 
Version 2.2.  
The RDAC was developed by the National Security Agency in 2002 by the 
System and Network Analysis Center (SNAC) of the National Security Agency (NSA) at 
the request of the Defense Information Systems Network (DISN) Flag Panel, who is 
ultimately responsible for the accreditation and connection approval for CDS devices. 
RDAC has been implemented within the collateral DISN community since 2003, and 
from 2003 thru 2007, RDAC 1.2 was the version in use. In 2007, two high-level reasons 
for updating the criteria from their original specification were incorporated into RDAC. 
These changes where implemented to provide finer granularity in conveying risk and 
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secondly, to improve the connection approval process for DISN community networks. 










Figure 2.   RDAC Comparison 
Only half of the RDAC wheel is applicable to the test methodology of the CT&E 
as the other half describes risk associated with non-technical issues for CDS devices. The 
new RDAC described in the RDAC Criteria v2.2 model updates the weight of the threat 
model roll-up, adds an access solution criteria chart, solidifies quality granularity, and 
filter strength.  An access solution criteria chart was added in order to address approval 
concerns with an access solution CDS. Quality granularity was improved by 
implementing a fourth choice for technical implementation in order to force subject 
matter experts to select a value and not to “stay on the fence” (as cited in RDAC Criteria 
v2.2, p. 9).  Lastly, filter strength was improved by reducing the number of mitigation 
concepts from four to three. The risk assignment methodology of RDAC is partially 
implemented using the prior RDAC release in the CASTER database application. The 
actual assignment of risk is accomplished independently of the CT&E assessments and is 





RDAC v 2.2 establishes three risks that must be analyzed: Technology Risk; Data 
Risk; and Attack Risk. Attack Risk and Data Risk, with the exception of Policy Threat, is 
not tested during CT&E, but is evaluated by NSA separately. Figure 3 shows the 
relationship between risks and threats (CT&E Handbook, Ver. 4.0 Draft, 2009, p. 100). 
 
Figure 3.   RDAC V2.2 Risk and Threats 
Technology Risks, together with the Policy Bypass Threats part of Data Risk, provide 
the core of CT&E testing. The four threats that make up the Technology Risk are 
Network Exploit Threat, Data Processing Threat, Role Exploit Threat, and Platform 
Compromise Threat, all of which are discussed below. 
• Network Exploit Threat, this type of threat indicates a level of assurance that 
the CDS device or platform adheres to the Open System Interconnection 
(OSI) stack.1 Additionally, separation of data is enforced to ensure that 
transfers are permitted to the connected networks at the physical, data link, 
network, and transport layers of the OSI stack.  
 
                                                 
1 Open System Interconnection (OSI) defines a networking framework model that implements 
protocols in seven layers, where control is passed in sequence from layer to layer. Retrieved 10 May 2010 
from Webs ite http://www.webopedia.com/quick_ref/OSI_Layers.asp. 
RDAC 2.2 
Technology Risk Data Risk Attack Risk * 
Network Exploit 
Threat 
Policy Threat * Identity Threat 
Data Processing 
Threat 










* - Not tested 
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• The Data Processing Threat is an indication how the CDS platform 
distinguishes data that is moved between security domains and provides 
appropriate security labeling when data is moved or transferred as defined in 
policy.   
• The Role Exploit Threat used the concept of least-privilege, so that changes 
affecting the CDS are monitored and recorded according to the defined 
security features and functions.  
• The final threat under Technology Risk is the Platform Compromise Threat 
that indicates a level of difficulty when configuration changes are made to the 
CDS regardless of whether they were authorized or not.  
The Policy Bypass Threat, part of the Data Risk assessment, measures the 
filtering mechanism of the CDS. These filters are designed to provide an effective 
implementation of a filter policy that permits regulation of data flow between security 
domains (CT&E Handbook, Ver. 4.0 Draft, 2009, pp. 100–103). 
The Attack Risk, as noted in Figure 3, measures the likelihood of both the risk of 
the environment into which the CDS is implemented, as well as the likelihood that the 
environment that the CDS is placed can be successfully exploited. The Policy Threat part 
of the Data Risk provides for specifications of the data payload passing through the CDS, 
while the Policy Bypass Threat verifies that data.   
B. CT&E TEST PHASE METHODOLOGY – END STATE 
Alignment of documentation and software in conduct of the CT&E is of 
paramount importance. The documentation must assist in providing the necessary 
structure and guidance to testers in order to provide a comprehensive body of evidence 
that has validity in determining, together with other risk factors, whether the accrediting 
agents have sufficient information to provide a connection approval for the CDS device. 
Connection approval is the final hurdle that a program manager or sponsored system 
developer must obtain to either connect, or place the CDS device on the approved 
product list.  
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Ideally, the CT&E Handbook is the entry point document for the CT&E testing 
organization. Thus, it must reflect current processes and guidance as developed by NSA 
and the UCDMO. Prior testing of any CDS device, by the test organization, must have 
undergone a vetting process that ensures that the product is ready for test. This initial 
entry requirement prevents a product under test from being in a constant state of 
modification. Testing of this nature is conducted during the Independent Verification and 
Validation (IV&V) testing phase. The current CT&E Handbook Version 4.0 is in the 
draft stages to improve the process of defining test objectives. The security controls, as 
specified in NIST SP 800-53, CNSSI 1253, and CNSS 1253A, are used in conjunction 
with the Unified Cross Domain Management Office’s (UCDMO) CDS Profile Tool. The 
CDS Profile Tool is available, at request, from the UCDMO and provides an initial 
assessment using the NIST SP 800-53 control, tailored to the type of CDS device under 
test. CASTER currently uses the security controls to assist the test community in ensuring 
that all required test scenarios are completed and that sufficient information is collected 
to provide a body of evidence. This evidence body is fed into a report and is used as a 
partial basis in determining connection approval by the DISN Flag panel. Responsibility 
for allowing the connection between different security domains is determined by the body 
of evidence created thru the CT&E testing process. Without approval of the Authority to 
Operate (ATO), the CDS device is not allowed to be used to mediate or process data on 
both sides of the security enclaves, rendering it useless in a CDS environment. 
C. TEST PLAN FRAMEWORK – IMPROVING THE STATUS QUO 
Numerous regulatory policies, handbooks, and guidance documents, appear to 
conflict and thus, affect test processes. The necessity of creating a test plan framework is 
apparent to ensure consistent and repetitive CT&E test results. Lack of a test framework 
causes confusion, can lengthen the test period and can also impact master schedules and 
budgets in the overall development of CDS devices. The creation of a test plan 
framework will improve the test methodology by ensuring that the test plan is tailored for 




risk guidance documents, provides a consistent result that can be used by the test 
community to ensure consistent testing processes and methods.  The proposed test plan 
framework uses these existing documents as shown in Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4.   The Framework 
The proposed test plan framework forces the participants to select a methodology 
that streamlines and ensures that the CDS under test uses the appropriate security 
controls. This framework allows development of a CDS test plan that is complete and 
addresses all security concerns in a systematic and controlled manner. The ultimate 
reason to test CDS devices is to discover and document vulnerabilities so that their 
associated risk can be identified, corrected, or managed.  
 D. TEST SCENARIO DEVELOPMENT – AN EXAMPLE 
Initial guidance for test scenario development is outlined in the Cross Domain 
Solution Certification Test and Evaluation Handbook.  The handbook uses a phased 
approach in the conduct of the CT&E.  The phases are as follows: 
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• Planning Phase – Assignment of roles, responsibilities, and working 
relationship between the Test Team, Vendor, and NSA PoC 
• Preparation Phase – Familiarization and CDS baseline installation; test 
objective development 
• Testing Phase – Define test procedures for each test objective; verify and 
test for record 
• Results Phase – Provide comments, vulnerabilities, and countermeasures; 
assign Collective Statement of Risk; provide the CDS CT&E report. 
Of the four phases, the preparation phase is the most critical to the success of the 
CT&E. Test procedures are created to provide a repeatable, step-by-step approach to 
validate the test objective.  The test procedures should be in sufficient granularity to 
afford repeatability and consistency in the test results.  Testing should also consider both 
negative and positive aspects, thus ensuring complete testing of the provided security 
functions of the CDS. Tailoring the test objective for a particular CDS device requires 
agreement between the test element and the NSA PoC. The tailoring of objectives is 
currently being developed to assist in providing a consistent number of pertinent test 
objectives that will satisfy the RDAC risk criteria. CASTER is the default database 
application tool used in the conduct of the CT&E test and is the repository of test results 
and associated reports used in the risk analysis for ultimate connection approval to DoD 
and other federal networks. The objectives from the Preparation Phase are loaded into the 
CASTER database and linked to the test procedure template, then displayed visually to 
the tester. The example test objective, below, selected to illustrate the testing process, 
reflects how the system implements the audit requirement for password failures.  
• Test Objective: Ensure that the system provides a mechanism to audit password 
failures. 
• Test Procedure development: 
o Ensure the CDS is in a known default state (from Preparation Phase) 
 Step 1: At the system login prompt, login as a normal user  
• Expected Result: System requests password  
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 Step 2: Enter an incorrect password 
• Expected Result: “Password is incorrect- try again”  
 Step 3: Enter the incorrect password again 
• Expected Result: “Password is incorrect- try again”  
 Step 4: Enter the incorrect password again 
• Expected Result: “Account Locked – contact System 
Administrator for Access”  
 Step 5: At the system login prompt, login as root (administrator)  
• Expected Result: System requests password  
 Step 6: Enter correct password 
• Expected Result: root is logged in and terminal is 
accessible 
 Step 7: Enter the command: {grep “password” /var/audit/audit.log 
| grep “locked”} 
• Expected Result: grep returns the record from the log that 
shows that the account is in lockout status for the user 
 Step 8: The final step normally restores any changes back to 
default and readies the system for the next test. 
o When this test is executed for record, the CASTER application provides 
the following result flags: Passed; Failed; Passed with Comment; and Not 
Tested. All flags, except the “Passed” flag must be addressed in view of 
vulnerabilities and mitigation of the risk of failure.  
This simple example demonstrates the amount of detail that is required to ensure 






A. CURRENT STATE ANALYSIS 
The Cross Domain Solution Certification Test and Evaluation Handbook Version 
3.4 last published in 2004, does not reflect current test processes that can be used by the 
independent government laboratories to provide “a structured, repeatable approach to 
assess the security and functional features of a CDS” (CT&E Handbook Ver. 3.4, 2006, 
p. 9).  One of the major changes in testing of CDS devices is the replacement of the 
Security Requirements 1 thru 9 as depicted in Table 1, with the risk criteria stated in the 
Risk Decision Authority Criteria Version 2.0. This change was effected via CASTER, a 
software database program, which provides the necessary mapping processes to enable 
the testers to map the nine security categories to risk elements. Modification to 
CASTER’s database structure uses the risk elements as testing criteria to ensure that all 
necessary security questions are answered in order to perform an accurate risk 
assessment. 
The current CDS risk and testing guidance uses outdated policy and guidance 
documents, especially the CT&E Handbook. Revision of this handbook is now in draft, 
with an expected release date during 2010. The only current guidance is RDAC Version 
2.2, which improves on RDAC Version 2.0 by aligning risk with threat elements, 
allowing risk values to support more granularity and therefore, provide a better risk 
assessment. Additional modification to the CASTER software to reflect the latest changes 
to RDAC is being discussed by the developers with input by the independent labs and 
NSA. Until documentation and processes are aligned to reflect a robust testing 
methodology, the independent tester will continue to struggle with ad hoc guidance from 
the NSA PoC in conduct of the CT&E test. 
B. END STATE ANALYSIS 
The entry point for CT&E testing is the CT&E Handbook as it provides guidance 
in the performance of the CDS test. The draft CT&E handbook, currently in the staffing 
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phase, is being rewritten to reflect the current testing methodology and incorporates 
changes brought about by the creation of the UCDMO. Reciprocity of test results 
between the DoD and IC communities has been the UCDMO’s greatest challenge. 
UCDMO, in concert with NSA, DoD, and NIST, are developing methods and processes 
that can produce a consistent body of evidence by the independent labs and the IC 
community lab for testing of CDS devices, both in the Secret and Below Information 
(SABI), and Top Secret and Below Information (TSABI) environments. Ideally, testing 
should be tailored to address security categories that cover both environments to reduce 
the costs involved in test duplication or additional testing for the different environments. 
In the final state, the TSABI and SABI risk analyses will merge, thus simplifying the risk 
analysis that is used in determining connection approval by the DISN Flag panel.   
Documents that provide further guidance to the test community are being revised 
and published to ensure that the security categories are being addressed in a repeatable 
process. CNSSG 1253A is a companion guideline to the Security Controls Catalog for 
National Security Systems (CNSSI 1253). CNSSI 1253 covers the steps in the Risk 
Management Framework that address security control selection and determines what 
security controls are needed to protect security information, in accordance with the 
security categories presented in Security Categorization for National Security 
Information and Information Systems (CNSS Instruction 1199).  CNSSG 1253A covers 
both the security control assessment and continuous monitoring steps in the Risk 
Management Framework and provides guidance in building and managing the assessment 
results.  
C. STATUS QUO ANALYSIS 
The lack of an overarching framework for the testing community introduces 
duplication, lack of consistent and repeatable results, and increases the cost for the user 
community in today’s constrained funding environment. Documents that are outdated 
must be updated, software programs used in the conduct of the CT&E must reflect 
current test methodology, and the establishment of a testing framework should be created 
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to assist in providing the development of a test plan that allows for a robust, repeatable, 
and more universally acceptable body of evidence by the testing community. 
D. SUMMARY 
New file formats, such as the Open Document Formats (ODF), Extensible 
Markup Language (XML) variants, Adobe Portable Document Format (PDF) and the 
latest versions of the Microsoft Office document formats, encourage the design of cross 
domain devices to allow for the sharing of information between security domains. Simple 
text files of the past, which use the ASCII2 encoding schema, have been relegated for use 
in computer language development and scripting applications. These ASCII text files are 
easily parsed and tested for illegal or malicious security content. Other complex file types 
have the capability to include metadata, thus increasing the risk of containing embedded 
code that may have malicious intent. Image and video files can also contain hidden text 
and active code programs, such as Microsoft’s ActiveX or Sun’s JAVA. These active 
code programs can provide a vector mechanism to infect the latest file formats. The 
current CDS devices must keep pace preventing and protecting against security transfer 
leakage, and detect and prevent malicious/virus code, including the detection of defined 
code words from traversing the security domains.  
The creation of a Test Plan Framework will provide the necessary guidance to 
define test processes and scenarios using a comprehensive test plan that can be shared 
with the test community to reduce schedule and costs. Additionally, the framework 
identifies all required documents and processes required during the conduct of the CT&E. 
Creation of this Test Plan Framework will enable a more structured approach to testing 
CDS devices and avoid questions that should have been answered during testing but 
where discovered after testing was completed. Although CT&E testing provides part of 
the input to the final risk assessment, it is critical that the testing covers all pertinent 
security categories to provide a body of evidence for those that must make a decision to 
connect or not connect the CDS to the existing cross-domain network infrastructure. 
                                                 
2 ASCII – American Standard Code for Information Interchange is a character-encoding scheme. 
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V. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSION 
Processes defined in the conduct of the CT&E are not clearly stated and can 
negatively impact the results of the CDS testing phase. The use of ad hoc or poorly 
defined objectives to arrive at a risk assessment reveals inconsistencies in the body of 
evidence. Since the result of this body of evidence determines, to some extent, the risk of 
the cross domain solution, it is imperative that the information collected be based on a 
risks-based plan. Handbooks and other guidance documents by themselves, do not 
guarantee efficient testing. Planning and tailoring the security requirement of the CDS 
under test provides an opportunity for better risk assessment, supporting the ultimate 
approval by the DISN Flag panel. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The creation of a Test Plan Framework that requires all participants to engage the 
testing community prior to any actual equipment testing is a solution that will improve 
the testing process by requiring that an approved Test Plan be provided as a key driver for 
a successful CT&E. The Test Plan Framework, shown in Figure 2, details key items that 
must be addressed for a successful CT&E. These key items include: 
Determining the CDS type: 
This determination is provided by NSA and consists primarily of two-way or one-
way Directional CDS devices. Data is restricted by policy or filter mechanisms. 
Selecting the UCDMO Profile:  
The profile considers the Security Controls in SP 800-53, which are specifically 
tailored for the CDS under test. This profile provides a first cut of security control items 
that may apply to the test event. 
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Tailoring the Profile: 
Once a profile has been selected, further tailoring focuses on the criticality of 
controls. Other security controls that have not been identified in SP 800-53 and SP 800-
53A are included in the modified profile (NIST SP 800-53A, 2008, p. 14). 
Coordinating and Selecting the Security Controls: 
Using SP 800-53A to help identify any other test detail (with the NSA POC) that 
are required to completely test the security control as it applies to RDAC (NIST SP 800-
53A, 2008, p. F5 – F288). 
Developing and Validating Test Scenarios: 
Development of test scenarios or procedures using the selected security controls 
and exercise of the procedures is accomplished during this phase. 
Executing the Test: 
The test procedures are execute and recorded.  
CT&E Reporting: 
A final CT&E test report should be developed using the test artifacts and 
associated results. Results of the report provide an improved method to arrive at a CDS 
risk assessment using RDAC guidelines. 
The Test Plan Framework is the enabler to ensure that the accrediting agents have 
the necessary risk analyses to make the ultimate decision to connect, or not connect the 
CDS device to the network. After all, the security of the network infrastructure is 
determined by the weakest link in the chain, or in this case, the most vulnerable Cross 
Domain Solutions device that is interconnected.  
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